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NOTE
ACTIONS ARISING OUT OF IMPROVEMENTS TO REAL
PROPERTY: SPECIAL STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The scope of liability for builders1 over the centuries has been
subject to great variation. It has shifted from the Babylonian Code
of Hammurabi, which at times required the death of a builder's son
if a house were unsoundly built, to the English and early American
rules which afforded almost total immunity to builders.2 The
shelter of immunity once available to American builders was
stripped away, however, by the judicial abandonment of the
requirement of privity between the builder and the injured party. 3
In some jurisdictions the scope of liability has been expanded
further by the adoption of a discovery rule.4 The result has been to
expose builders in many jurisdictions to potentially perpetual
liability to an unlimited class of people.
In response to demands for protection by members of the
1. The term "builder" as used in this Note includes architects, engineers, contractors, and all
others who are engaged in the design, planning, supervision or observation of construction, or
construction of improvements to real property, unless otherwise indicated.
2. See generally Witherspoon, A rchitects' and Engineers' Tort Liability, 16 DEF. L.J. 409 (1967). See
also Neeson, The Current Status of Professional Architects' and Engineers' Malpractice Liability Insurance, 45
INS. COUNSELJ. 39 (1978).
3. See generally Witherspoon, supra note 2.
4. Courts which apply the discovery rule generally hold that a cause of action accrues and the
applicable statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or should know of a breach of
duty. See Comment, 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 568 (1976). See also j. ACRET, ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS:
THEIR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 255-66 (1977); Note, Malpractice: The Design Professional's
Dilemma, I0.J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 287, 302-03 (1976).
44 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
construction industry, and perhaps in an attempt to achieve a
balance between conflicting concerns, the legislatures of many
states, including North Dakota, have enacted special statutes
governing actions arising out of improvements to real property.
5
While these statutes differ individually, they have as their common
characteristic a time limitation after which no action may be
brought against a builder.
6
The special statutes limiting the time within which an action
may be filed against a builder have produced a great deal of
commentary and controversy. The purpose of this Note will be to
analyze North Dakota's special statute, section 28-01-44 of the
North Dakota Century Code, 7 in light of recent developments, and
to suggest possible methods of resolving some of the problems
which may arise in connection with this statute.
5. See Comment, Limitation ofAction StatutesforArchitects and Builders - Blueprint for Non-Action, 18
CATH. U.L. REV. 361 (1969). See also Vandall, Architects' Liability in Georgia. A Special Statute of
Limitations, 14 GA. S.B.J. 164 (1978); Note, Malpractice: The Design Professional's Dilemma, 10J. MAR.
J. PRAC. & PRoC. 287 (1977); Note, Legislation: Oklahoma's Statute Limiting Actions Against Designers and
Builders ofImprovements to Real Property, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 723 (1974).
States which have not enacted a special statute to limit the time period in which actions against
builders may be brought are Arizona, Idaho, Iowa, New York, Vermont, and West Virginia. Some
other states have defined the group of people covered by the statute more narrowly than is generally
assumed for the purposes of this Note. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5839 (1968) (applying the
limitation period to licensed architects and professional engineers).
6. See Neeson, supra note 2, at 44. -Some of the differences among the statutes include the class of
potential defendants who may invoke the statute, the actions to which the statute applies, the time
period designated in the statute, and the time at which the statute begins to run.
7. Section 28-01-44 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
1. No action, whether in contract, oral or written, sealed or unsealed; in tort or
otherwise, to recover damages:
a. For any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision or observation of
construction or construction of an improvement to real property;
b. For injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such deficiency;
or
c. For injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any such
deficiency,
shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning,
supervision or observation of construction, or construction of such an improvement
more than ten years after substantial completion of such an improvement.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 1, in the case of such an injury
to property or the person or such an injury causing wrongful death, which injury
occurred during the tenth year after such substantial completion, an action in tort to
recover damages for such an injury or wrongful death may be brought within two
years after the date on which such injury occurred, irrespective of the date of death,
but in no event may such an action be brought more than twelve years after the
substantial completion of construction of such an improvement.
Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending the period prescribed by
the laws of this state for the bringing of any action.
3. The limitation prescribed by this section shall not be asserted by way of defense
by any person in actual possession or the control, as owner, tenant, or otherwise, of
such an improvement at the time any deficiency in such an improvement constitutes
the proximate cause of the injury or death for which it is proposed to bring an action.
4. As used in this section, the term "person" shall mean an individual,
corporation, partnership, business trust, unincorporated organization, association, or
joint stock company.
N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01-44 (1974).
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'II. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 28-01-44
Section 28-01-44 was enacted by the legislature in 1967 as a
special statute of limitations applying to "any person performing or
furnishing the design, planning, supervision or observation of
construction, or construction" of an improvement to real
property.8 The Supreme Court of North Dakota has not had an
opportunity to construe or determine the validity of this special
statute. Furthermore, there is little legislative history to guide the
courts which may be called upon to construe the statute. 9 Thus, the
decisions of other jurisdictions construing similar statutes may play
an important part in the initial interpretation of section 28-01-44.
Courts should be cautious, however, in applying the decisions of
other jurisdictions because of the dissimilarities which exist among
the various statutes. 10
A. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN IMPROVEMENT TO REAL PROPERTY?
The threshold question in determining whether the special
statute of limitations applies in a particular case is whether the case
is one involving an "improvement to real property." The
legislature failed to define this phrase within the provisions of the
statute itself.1 As a result of this omission, courts will be called
upon to define what constitutes an improvement to real property
before applying section 28-01-44.
One approach that has been employed by courts in
determining what constitutes an improvement to real property
involves a complicated analysis under the common-law fixture
laws. Under this approach, a chattel determined to be a fixture is
considered by its very nature to be an improvement to real
property. 12
8. N.D. CENT. CODES 28-01-44(1) (1974).
9. Section 28-01-44 was enacted "[t]o provide a period of limitation within which time claims
for damages may be brought against persons performing or furnishing the design, planning,
supervision or observation of construction of improvements on real property." 1967 N.D. Sess.
Laws ch. 254.
The legislature never articulated the reason underlying the enactment of section 28-01-44. The
only legislative minutes in existence are those of the 1967 Senate Judiciary Committee, which
indicate that fourteen architects and engineers from North Dakota appeared in support of the statute,
then Senate Bill 303, A letter was filed and testimony was given by representatives of design
professionals, suggesting that the bill be passed to alleviate insurance problems and to limit the
possibility of perpetual liability for design professionals.
10. See supra note 6.
11. It is not uncommon for a statute to contain a definition of such a word. For example, a
provision of the North Dakota Century Code relating to mechanics' liens defines "improvement" as
"any building, structure, erection, construction, alteration, repair, removal, demolition,
excavation, landscaping, or any part thereof, existing, built, erected, improved, placed, made, or
done on real estate for its permanent benefit." N.D. CENT. CODE S 35-27-01 (3) (1980).
12. Allentown Plaza Assoc. v. Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 43 Md. App. 337, __ , 405
A.2d 326, 331 n.9 (1979).
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A fixture is defined in the North Dakota Century Code:
A thing [which] is deemed to be affixed to land when it is
attached to it by roots, as in the case of trees, vines, or
shrubs, or embedded in it, as in the case of walls, or per-
manently resting upon it, as in the case of buildings, or
permanently attached to what is thus permanent, as by
means of cement, plaster, nails, bolts or screws. ' 3
This definition would offer some guidance if the fixture approach to
determining what constitutes an improvement to real property
were adopted in North Dakota. In determining whether personalty
has become a fixture under such an approach, courts would also be
required to consider the intention of the person making the
annexation, the manner in which the thing was annexed, and its
adaptation to the use of the realty. '
4
The fixture approach has not been popular among states faced
with the issue. Courts have recognized that all improvements to
teal property are not necessarily fixtures.' 5 Thus, the fixture
approach cannot always provide an answer when the issue is raised.
Therefore, a "common-sense" interpretation of the phrase' 6 is
preferable to the fixture approach.
The common-sense approach to what constitutes an
improvement to real property has been preferred by most courts
which have addressed this issue. Under this approach, the question
of what constitutes an improvement to real property is generally
considered to be one of law,' 7 while under the fixture approach the
issue is considered a mixed question of law and fact.' 8 Although
courts employing the common-sense approach may consider many
of the same factors that are considered under the fixture approach,
they are freed from the strictures of common law and may
determine the meaning of the statute "on the basis of the common
usage of language." 19
Black's Law Dictionary defines an improvement to real property
as a "valuable addition made to property (usually real estate) or an
13. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 47-01-05 (1978).
14. Strobel v. Northwest Grand Forks Mut. Ins. Co., 152 N.W.2d 794, 796 (N.D. 1967).
15. See, e.g., Pinneo v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 14 Wash. App. 848, 851, 545 P.2d 1207, 1209(1976).
16. See Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn. 1977)
(court applied a common-sense interpretation to the phrase "improvement to real property").
17. See Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 386, 225 N.W.2d 454, 457
(1975).
18. Allentown Plaza Assoc. v. Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 43 Md. App. 337, -, 405
A.2d 326, 331 n.9 (1979).
19. Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 386, 225 N.W.2d 454, 456 (1975).
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amelioration in its condition amounting to more than mere repairs
or replacement, costing labor or capital, and intended to enhance
its value, beauty or utility or to adapt it for new or further
purposes." ' 20 A somewhat similar, but more liberal, definition is
found in the North Dakota Century Code provisions relating to
mechanic's liens.21 Both of these definitions suggest that to be an
improvement the work must in some way enhance the value or
usefulness of the property, and, in addition, be permanent in
nature.
Similar requirements have been articulated by courts which
have applied the common-sense approach. Under such an analysis,
the nature of the improvement, its relationship to the land and its
occupants, and its permanence have been considered.2 2 In
addition, it has been suggested that the parties through contract can:
establish whether or not a thing is to be considered an improvement
to real property by designating that a particular chattel is to remain
personalty. 23 This use of contract, however, "is limited to chattels
which are attached to the realty in such a manner that they may be
detached without being destroyed or materially injured or without
materially injuring the realty to which they are attached. "24
In enacting section 28-01-44, the legislature chose not to define
what constitutes an improvement to real property. This omission
avoided difficulties which might have arisen if courts had been
bound by a formal definition of this phrase. Therefore, North
Dakota courts are free to adopt the common-sense approach in
applying section 28-01-44, thereby permitting a determination of
what constitutes an improvement to real property based upon the
facts of each particular case. Under the ciricumstances, courts
should not restrict themselves unnecessarily by incorporating the
inflexible rules which may be applicable under fixture laws.
Rather, the common-sense approach, which gives courts flexibility
in determining what constitutes an improvement to real property,
should be adopted.
20. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 682 (5th ed. 1979).
21. N.D. CENT. CODE S 35-27-01(3) (1980). See also supra note 11. The definition found in the
North Dakota Century Code would apply the term "improvement to real property" to repairs as
well as original improvements. Because those who provide repairs are faced with problems of liability
similar to those faced by builders, this broader definition may be preferable. To limit the definition to
those who provide services originally, thereby excluding those who provide repairs from the
operation of the statute, might also produce equal protection problems.
22. Allentown Plaza Assoc. v. Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 43 Md. App. 337, -, 405
A.2d 326, 332 (1979) (holding that gas meters and their couplings were not an improvement to real
property because they were not permanent in nature).
23. Id. at__, 405 A.2d at 332-33.
24. 1 THOMPSON, RsAL PROPERTY S.80, at 358 (1980).
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B. ACTIONS GOVERNED BY SECTION 28-01-44
There are generally two classes of people who bring actions
against builders for damages for injuries arising out of an
improvement to real property - owners or possessors of the
property 25 and third parties who are injured while on the
property.2 6 Such actions may be based upon malpractice,
27
negligence, 2  breach of contract,2 9 breach of warranty,30  and
various other theories of tort.3 ' The type of action brought
generally depends upon the party bringing the lawsuit and their
relationship to the builder.
After considering the various theories of liability and the
potential plaintiffs, some jurisdictions have interpreted their special
statute of limitations applying to builders in such a way as to allow
certain types of actions to be filed after the expiration of the special
time limit. For instance, in Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc.,3 2
the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the state's special statute
of limitations33 did not apply to contractual claims based upon
deficiencies in the structure itself.34 The court reasoned that the
legislature did not intend to substitute a two-year bar for the six-
year statute of limitations35 which ordinarily governed such
actions.3 6 A similar decision was reached by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota in Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Associates.3 7 In
25. See, e.g., Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash.
2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972) (action by a cold storage warehouse owner and lessee for property
damage allegedly caused by the defective design and installation of a faulty refrigeration system).
26. See, e.g., Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed, 401
U.S. 901 (1971) (action for the wrongful death of a fourteen-year-old newspaperboy who was crushed
to death while attempting to use an elevator in a public building).
27. See City ofAurora v. Bechtel Corp., 599 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1979).
28. See Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972).
29. See Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., 308 Minn. 237, 241 N.W.2d 799 (1976).
30. See Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973).
31. See Bouser v. City of Lincoln Park, 83 Mich. App. 167, 268 N.W.2d 332 (1978) (failure to
warn); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976) (failure to warn and provide
adequate instructions); Nevada Lakeshore Co. v. Diamond Elec., Inc., 89 Nev. 293, 511 P.2d 113
(1973) (strict liability in tort); Hill v. Forrest & Cotton, Inc., 555 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)
(wrongful death).
32. 194 Colo. 441, 578 P.2d 637 (1978).
33. COLO. REV. STAT. S 13-80-127 (1974) (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. 5 13-80-127
(Supp. 1979)). This statute required that an action be brought within two years after the claim arose,
and set an outside time limit often years within which such actions must be filed. Id. This statute was
substantially amended in 1979. Modifications incluo1e an expanded grace period for injuries late in
the ten-year period and a provision establishing a discovery rule, see supra note 4, under the statute.
The statute, however, still provides for a two-year period of limitation in the ordinary case. COLO.
REV. STAT. S 13-80-127 (Supp. 1979).
34. Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 194 Colo. 441, 445, 578 P.2d 637, 640 (1978)
(home bought from builder-vendor was defective).
35. COLO. REV. STAT. S 13-80-110 (1974) (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-110
(Supp. 1979)).
36. 194 Colo. at 441, 578 P.2d at 640.
37. 308 Minn. 237, 241 N.W.2d 799 (1976).
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Kittson County, the court avoided a constitutional challenge to
Minnesota's special statute of limitations38 by finding that the
statute did not apply to actions which sounded in breach of contract
and warranty when the plaintiff was in privity with the
defendants.
39
The statutes interpreted in Kittson County and Duncan both
used general language to preclude the filing of an action after a
certain time, without specifically stating the types of actions to
which the statute applied.40 In each case a contrary result would
have significantly reduced the time allowed in which to bring that
particular type of action.
4 1
Problems such as those which existed in Kittson County and
Duncan will not arise under section 28-01-44, because this section is
.not worded in general terms. It specifically states that "no action"
to recover damages shall be brought against a person who has
provided services in connection with an improvement to real
property, whether that action be "in contract, oral or written,
sealed or unsealed; in tort or otherwise." '4 2 This explicit wording
indicates that the legislature did not intend to exclude from the
operation of the statute any type of action or any potential class of
plaintiffs. This conclusion is reinforced by the care taken in both
Duncan and Kittson County to distinguish statutes similar to section
28-01-44 which contain additional language that specifically
broadens their scope to include actions by owners sounding in
breach of contract.4 3 Furthermore, section 28-01-44 does not
change the statute of limitations generally applicable in any type of
action which may be brought.44 It merely establishes an absolute
38. MINN. STAT. 5 541.051 (1976) (current version at MINN. STAT. 5 541.051 (1980)).
39. Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., 308 Minn. 237, 243, 241 N.W.2d 799, 802
(1976). In Kitson Couny, the court held that such actions are governed by the six-year statute of
limitations applicable to contracts in general. Id. Subsequently, in Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-
Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Minn. 1977), the special statute of limitations was declared un-
constitutional.
40. Section 541.051(1) of the Minnesota Statutes, as in effect at the time of Kittson Couny,
provided in part: "Except where fraud is involved, no action to recover damages for any injury to
property, real or personal, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and un-
safe condition of an improvement to real property, . . . shall be brought . MINN. STAT.
541.051(1) (1976) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 541.051(1) (1980)).
Section 13-80-127(1) of the Colorado Revised Statutes provided in part: "All actions
brought to recover damages for injury to person or property caused by the design, planning, super-
vision, inspection, construction or observation of construction of any improvement to real property
shall be brought .... " COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-80-127(1) (1974) (current version at COLO. REV.
STAT. S 13-80-127(l)(Supp. 1979)).
41. See infra note 44.
42. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-44(1) (1974).
43. 194 Colo. at 445 n.5, 578 P.2d at 640 n.5; 308 Minn. at 243, 241 N.W.2d at 802.
44. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-44(2) (1974). Unlike section 28-01-44, the Colorado and Min-
nesota statutes each provided a new two-year statute of limitations which began to run upon
discovery of the defect, in addition to the special ten-year absolute cut-off of claims. Thus, if these
statutes had been applied to actions arising in contract the result would have been to shorten the
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cut-off of actions ten years after construction is complete. Courts
should therefore be wary of defining the scope of this statute too
narrowly. Section 28-01-44 should be applied in any action as long
as it arises out of a defect in an improvement to real property. 
45
C. PERSONS WHO MAY INVOKE SECTION 28-01-44
There has been some disagreement among jurisdictions
regarding what classes of persons will receive the protection of the
special statutes of limitations. The issue has at times. been
significant, because the exclusion of certain classes from the
operation of a statute may have an effect on the constitutionality of
the statute.
4 6
Section 28-01-44, like most of the special statutes of
limitations, is specifically worded to exclude persons in actual
possession or control of the property, such as owners and tenants. 47
It is unlike the Michigan special statute, however, which limits the
class of persons entitled to invoke the statute to licensed
professionals.4 8 Section 28-01-44, aside from excluding those in
possession and control of the property, is phrased in general
terms.4 9 Given the relative absence of legislative history to clarify
the general language adopted by the legislature, 50 the task of
determining who may invoke the protection of section 28-01-44 will
eventually fall to the judiciary.
Courts which have been faced with the problem of interpreting
generally worded statutes similar to section 28-01-44 have arrived
at differing conclusions regarding who may invoke the protection of
such statutes. For example, in Skinner v. Anderson,51 the Supreme
Court of Illinois found that its special statute52 granted exclusive
limitation period in each case by four years. Such an intent should not be inferred without a more
specific directive from the legislature. Therefore, the courts in Kittson Counov and Duncan seem to be
justified in reaching their conclusions. As a general rule, North Dakota's special statute does not up-
set existing statutes of limitations, but merely provides an absolute cut-off of claims after ten years.
Thus, the problems which arose in Minnesota and Colorado have been avoided, and courts should
not unnecessarily limit application of section 28-01-44.
45. See supra notes 11-24 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Il1. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967) (holding the Illinois
special statute to be a violation of equal protection because it granted a special immunity to architects
and engineers, excluding others involved in the construction industry, such as materialmen).
47. N.D. CENT. CooE S 28-01-44(3)(1974).
48. See MicH. CoMp. LAWS S 600.5839 (1968) (governing actions against "any state licensed ar-
chitect or professional engineer performing or furnishing the design or supervision of construction"
of an improvement to real property). By its specific language this statute excludes anyone who is not
licensed who takes part in the construction of an improvement to real property, or who supplies
materials used in the construction. This statute is therefore distinguishable from statutes which are
worded in general terms and are capable of a broader interpretation.
49. See supra note 7.
50. See supra note 9.
51. 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
52. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, S 24f (Smith-Hurd 1966) (reenacted as ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, .
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immunity to architects and contractors, 53 excluding materialmen
and all others who furnished services in the construction of an
improvement to real property. 54 A different conclusion was reached
in Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 55 in which the Supreme Court
of New Jersey noted that the phrase "any person performing or
furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or
construction of such improvement to real property ' 56 included a
class "much larger than architects and builders. ' 57 The court in
Rosenberg, however, did not go on to describe the class of persons
which would fall within the language of the statute.
Section 28-01-44 contains language almost identical to that
construed in both Rosenberg and Skinner.58 The use of the phrase
"any person" in the statute arguably suggests that the statute was
not intended to apply to any particular vocation or occupation.
59
The court's decision in Skinner, limiting the application of the
statute to architects and building contractors, may therefore have
been unnecessarily narrow. Since the North Dakota legislature did
not include a requirement in section 28-01-44 that one must be an
architect or a contractor by- professiori in order to invoke the
statute's protection, courts may avoid reading such a requirement
into the special statute. 60 Rather, section. 28-01-44 may be read "as
applying to all who can, by a sensible 'eading of the words of the
act, be brought within its ambit. "61 Such an approach would seem
to be appropriate because it is consistent with the general policy
underlying the special statutes: protection of those who provide
services in connection with the construction of an improvement to
real property.
6 2
Assuming that section 28-01-44 does not apply solely to
professional architects and contractors, but rather applies to
anyone who provides services in connection with an improvement
to real property, there is the additional question of whether the
22.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980)).
53. Skinner v. Anderson, 38 111. 2d 455, 459, 231 N.E.2d 588, 590 (1967).
54. Id. at 460,231 N.E.2dat 591.
55. 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972).
56. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 14-1.1 (West Supp. 1972) (currently codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. S
2A: 14-1.1 (West Supp. 1980)).
57. Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N .J. 190, , 293 A.2d 662, 668 (1972).
58. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, S 24f(Smith-Hurd 1966) with N.D. CENT. CooE § 28-01-
44(1) (1974) and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1.1 (West Supp. 1972) (currently codified at N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:14-1.1 (West Supp. 1980)).
59. Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528,
, 503 P.2d 108, 111 (1972).
60. Such an interpretation cannot be avoided, however, if the special statute is specifically wor-
ded to include only certain professionals. See supra note 48.
61. 61 N.J. at__, 293 A.2dat666.
62. See generally Comment, Limitation ofAction Statutes for Architects and Builders - Blueprint for Non-
Action, 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 361 (1969).
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statute applies to materialmen. 63 Several courts have held that
materialmen are excluded from the class of persons who mayinvoke
the special statute of limitations, 64 while others have ignored this
question 65 or have found it unnecessary to resolve the issue on the
facts presented.6 6 At least one court, however, has suggested that
materialmen are entitled to the protection of the special
legislation.
67
The language employed in section 28-01-44 offers some
guidance in the resolution of the issue. As in any problem of
statutory construction, courts will be guided by the plain language
of the statute when interpreting section 28-01-44.68 The statute
specifically designates those activities in which an individual must
be engaged before claiming the protection of the statute: "the
design, planning, supervision or observation of construction, or
construction" of an improvement to real property. 69 The common
characteristic of all these activities is that they are services.
Therefore, if the plain language of the statute controls,
materialmen probably will not be included within the class entitled
to invoke the protection of section 28-01-44, because they are
persons who provide goods rather than services.
A careful reading of section 28-01-44 suggests that the only
plausible argument for including materialmen under the statute is
that they are persons performing construction. In order to reach
such a conclusion, however, a court would have to stretch the
ordinary meaning of the word "construction." 70 To "construct"
63. The term "materialman" is used in this Note to distinguish those who provide materials
and parts from those who provide services in connection with the construction of an improvement to
real property. In this regard, it might be possible for an entity to be both a supplier of goods and a
supplier of services, and thus be subject to suit in differing capacities.
64. Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967); Pacific Indem. Co. v.
Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977); Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241
S.E.2d 739 (1978); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454
(1975).
These decisions are based on generally worded statutes similar to section 28-01-44. Specifically
worded statutes may by their language also exclude materialmen. Seesupra note 48.
65. See, e.g., Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash.
2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972) (opinion does not mention the issue of whether materialmen fall within
the special statutes).
6. See, e.g., Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978)
(court found it unnecessary to determine whether materialmen were excluded because of the
particular facts involved).
67. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 330'F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Va. 1971)
(manufacturer of 4,500-pound jute picker machine affixed to a heavy concrete foundation in a jute
factory by means of heavy hold-down bolts was entitled to invoke the special statute). In response to
this interpretation of the Virginia Code, the legislature subsequently amended the special statute to
provide: "This limitation shall not apply to the manufacturer or supplier of any equipment or
machinery or any other articles which are installed in or become a part of any real property either as
an improvement or otherwise." 1973 Va. Acts ch. 247 (current version at VA. CODE § 8.01-250
(1977)).
68. Tormasehy v. Hjelle, 210 N.W.2d 100, 102 (N.D. 1973).
69. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01-44(1)(1974).
70. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 283 (5th ed. 1979) (construction defined as "[the process of
bringing together and correlating a number of independent entities, so as to form a definite entity").
NOTE
commonly means to "build,' ''erect," or "'put together
constituent parts." 71  Thus, performing construction is
distinguishable from merely providing the constituent or
component parts which are necessary in the construction process,
and one whose only contribution to an improvement is to provide
such things as lumber, paints, or nails should arguably not be
considered to have performed "construction."
The conclusion thatmaterialmen should be excluded from the
operation of the special statute is reinforced by another
consideration. To construe section 28-01-44 to include
materialmen would require a court to find that by enacting the
special statute in 1967 the legislature intended to "severely limit the
development of products liability. "72 It is doubtful that such an
intention existed, especially in light of the legislature's recent
enactment of legislation similar to section 28-01-44 in the area of
products liability. 73 Therefore, courts that are called upon to
construe section 28-01-44 should interpret the words as they are
commonly understood and exclude materialmen from the
protection of the statute.
D. THE LIMITATION PERIODS UNDER SECTION 28-01-44
Section 28-01-44 provides that no action shall be brought
"more than ten years after substantial completion ' 74 of the
improvement to real property giving rise to the injury. 75 Read
alone, this particular provision might seem to create a new statute
of limitations applicable to all actions arising out of improvements
to real property. 76 Subsection 2 of section 28-01-44, however, goes
on to state: "Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending
the period prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any
action." ' 77 This additional provision indicates that the special
71. Id. (construct defined: "To build; erect; put together; make ready for use. To adjust and
join materials, or part of, so as to form a permanent whole. To put together constituent parts of
something in their proper place and order. ").
72. Sevilla v. Stearns-Roger, Inc., 101 Cal. App. 3d 608, 161 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1980).
73. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 28-01.1 (Supp. 1979) (granting an absolute cut-off of actions against
manufacturers after ten years).
74. In light of case law in this area, the issue of what constitutes substantial completion of an
improvement to real property does not appear to be of major significance. This may be due in part to
the fact that the term is defined in many of the special statutes. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. S 13-80-
127(5) (1974 & Supp. 1979) (defining "substantial completion" as "that degree of completion of an
improvement to real property as which the owner can conveniently utilize the improvement for the
purposes for which it was intended").
75. N.D. CENT. CODES 28-01-44(1) (1974).
76. Some of the special statutes of limitations do provide for a new statute of limitations, as well
as an absolute cut-off of actions after a specified time period. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. S 541.051 (1980)
(providing a two-year statute of limitations following discovery and a ten-year absolute cut-off of
actions).
77. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01-44(2) (1974).
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statute was not meant to supersede or modify existing statutes
which would otherwise be applicable. Decisions from other
jurisdictions reinforce this conclusion.
In O'Connor v. Altus, 78 an action was brought by a child and her
father for injuries sustained when she walked through a glass
sidelight adjoining a glass door in an apartment building. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey noted that the special statute79 was
not a typical statute of limitations.80 Rather, the statute was found
to have impliedly incorporated the two-year statute of limitations
generally applicable to all personal injury actions in New Jersey. 81
Thus, the court indicated that the two-year personal injury statute
"operate[s] to restrict the period in which actions can be initiated
for accidents occurring within ten years after construction; but it
does not serve to extend beyond ten years from the date
construction was completed the time within which suit may be
filed. "82 A similar conclusion was reached in Comptroller of Virginia
ex rel. Virginia Military Institute, v. King, 83 an action by an owner
against an architect for the alleged negligent design of a building.
In King, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that the special
statute of limitations84 "sets an outside limit within which the
applicable statutes of limitation operate, ' ' 85 noting that the purpose
of the statute was "to establish an arbitrary termination date after
which no litigation of the type specified may be initiated. "86 These
decisions indicated that 'the special statutes of limitations in
question did not supersede existing limitation periods, even though
the statutes interpreted87 contained no specific language directing
such a result. 88
A Louisiana statute89  similar to section 28-01-44 was
interpreted in Carr v. Mississippi Valley Electric Co. 90 The Supreme
Court of Louisiana held that a person who was injured more than
ten years after substantial completion of work on an improvement
78. 67 N.J. 106, 335 A.2d 545 (1975).
79. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1.1 (West Supp. 1972) (currently codified at NJ. STAT. ANN.
2A:14-1.1 (West Supp. 1980)).
80. O'Connorv. Altus, 67 N.J. 106,-, 335 A.2d 545, 553 (1975).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 217 Va. 751, 232 S.E.2d895 (1977).
84. VA. CODE § 8.01-250 (1977).
85. Comptroller of Virginia ex rel. Virginia Military Inst. v. King, 217 Va. 751, -, 232
S.E.2d 895,899 (1977).
86. Id.
87. N.J. STAT. ANN. S 2A:14-1.1 (West Supp. 1980); VA. CODE 58.01-250(1977).
88. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01-44(2) with NJ. STAT. ANN. S 2A:14-1.1 (West Supp.
1980) andVA. CODE S8.01-250 (1977).
89. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2772 (West 1965).
90. 285 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
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to real property was precluded from filing a tort suit against the
contractor who constructed the improvement. 91 The plaintiff in
Carr argued that such an interpretation of the special statute would
result in a conflict with the one-year statute of limitations
prescribed for such an injury in ordinary cases. 92 The court
dismissed this argument, explaining that it was for the legislature to
determine which party should bear the loss in such cases.
93
In light of the decisions in other jurisdictions and of the
particular language of section 28-01-44, that statute should be
construed as establishing a ten-year absolute cut-off of actions
which arise out of improvements to real property, but not as
otherwise affecting the previously existing limitation periods.
94
Viewed in this manner, the statute modifies the law applicable to
91. Carr v. Mississippi Valley Elec. Co., 285 So. 2d 301,302 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The general rules governing the time within which actions must be commenced in North
Dakota are found in chapter 28-01 of the North Dakota Century Code. Section 28-01-16 applies to
damages arising out of contracts, express and implied obligations, general injuries to persons,
injuries to chattels, and in other cases not specifically provided for. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01-16
(Supp. 1979). A six-year limitation period is provided for in such cases. Id. Wrongful death actions
are governed by section 28-01-18(4), which provides for a two-year limitation period that begins to
run upon the death of the injured party. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28.01-18(4) (Supp. 1979).
Some builders, professional architects and engineers especially, may wish to argue that they fall
within the terms of section 28-01-18(3), which applies in actions to recover damages resulting from
malpractice. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-01-18(3) (Supp. 1979). North Dakota is one of a handfull of
states which do not specifically list those professionals who may invoke the malpractice limitation
period. New York has a malpractice statute of limitations similar to section 28-01-18(3). N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAW S 214(6) (McKinney 1972).
In County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 889, 358 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct.
1974), an action against an architect for alleged negligence in the design and supervision of
construction of the county library, the court held that, although the relationship between the parties
originated in contract, the gravamen of the action was professional malpractice. Therefore, the
applicable statute of limitations was three years, rather than the six-year period generally provided
for contracts. This decision was followed in Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., 54 A.D.2d 13,
385 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1976), in which the court again applied the malpractice statute of limitations to
an action for negligent design. The court noted that the services provided were clearly professional
and similar to services provided by an attorney or doctor. The case was later modified to the extent
that it applied the shorter malpractice statute. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., 43 N.Y.2d 389,
372 N.E.2d 555, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1977). In reversing the lower court on this point, the court noted
that all the obligations of the architects, whether characterized in tort for malpractice or in contract
for the nonperformance of a particular provision, arose out of the contractual relationship between
the parties. Id. at__ , 372 N.E.2d at 558, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 770.
Although the argument that architects should be governed by the malpractice statute of
limitations has been rejected by New York, a North Dakota court might be persuaded that such a
statute should apply, in view of the fact that the term "malpractice" has been used to describe the
negligence of a variety of professionals. For example, Michigan now allows a malpractice action
against "any person professing or holding himself out to be a member of a state licensed profession."
MICH. COMP. LAWS S 600.2912 (1968). Dean Prosser has articulated a reason for the expanded
meaning of the term "malpractice":
Professional men in general, and those who undertake any work calling for special
skill, are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do, but also to
possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability. Most of the decided
cases have dealt with physicians and surgeons, but the same is undoubtedly true of
dentists, pharmacists, psychiatrists, attorneys, architects and engineers, accountants,
abstractors of title, and many other professions and even skilled trades.
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 5 32, at 161-62 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
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cases arising out of improvements to real property only in certain
instances. 91
Prior to the passage of the special statute, a person who was
injured eleven years after the date on which construction of an
improvement to real property was substantially complete would
have had a cause of action accruing at the time of the injury,9 6 and
would have had six years within which to bring an action. 97 Under
section 28-01-44, however, an individual who is injured in the
eleventh year after construction is substantially complete has no
cause of action against the architects, engineers, contractors, and
others who provided services in connection with the construction of
the improvement.9" In such cases the special statute operates to
prevent a right of action against the builders from ever accruing,
rather than merely limiting the rights of the individual to proceed
against these parties. 99
The ten-year period provided in section 28-01-44 does not
extend the time period within which a suit against builders may be
filed. If an injury occurs in the first year following completion of
construction, the special statute will have no effect whatsoever. The
cause of action in such cases is governed solely by the statute of
limitations generally applicable to such actions. 100 The special
statute will be applicable, however, when an injury occurs later in
the ten-year period. In such instances, the statute might serve to
shorten the time period within which the action must be filed,
although it might not eliminate the right of action completely. 10 1
For example, if a person is injured eight years and nine months
after construction is substantially complete, the injured party will
have one year and three months within which he must file his
claim. 102
95. See infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
96. Ordinarily the statute of limitations begins to run when the right to prosecute a cause of
action to a successful conclusion comes into existence. Wittrock v. Weisz, 73 N.W.2d 355 (N.D.
1955). Therefore, if a person was injured eleven years following the completion of construction prior
to the enactment of section 28-01-44, that person had no cause of action until the time of the injury,
and the statute of limitations did not begin to run until that time. Id. Under section 28-01-44,
however, the ten-year limitation period runs from the time construction is substantially complete,
regardless of the time of the injury.
97. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01-16(5) (Supp. 1979).
98. See supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 277-84 and accompanying text.
100. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-44(2) (1974); see supra note 44.
101. Under section 28-01-44 the determinative event is the filing of the action. It is not sufficient
that the injury, which causes the generally applicable statute of limitations to begin to run, occurs
within the ten-year period. The action must actually be filed within the ten-year period or it will be
barred, even though it might not have been barred in the absence of the special statute. Therefore, in
cases where the generally applicable statute of limitations would not run before the expiration of the
ten-year period, the generally applicable statute of limitations is of no consequence.
102. Ordinarily, the injured party would have six years within which to file an action under the
generally applicable statute of limitations. See N.D. CENT. ConE 5 28-01-16(5) (Supp. 1979).
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Under the general operation of section 28-01-44, the time for
filing an action would be extremely short if the injury occurred
very late in the ten-year period.' 0 3 The legislature, however,
recognized the harsh consequences that could result if someone
were injured very late in the ten-year time period and created an
exception for such cases. When an injury to a person or property
occurs during the tenth year, an action in tort may be brought
within two years after the date on which the injury occurred.10 4 The
adoption of this grace period has the desirable result of preventing
the harsh and seemingly unfair consequences that would otherwise
occur.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 28-01-44
The special statutes of limitations applicable to builders have
been the subject of much controversy in recent years. Since their
enactment they have been attacked in many jurisdictions as being
violative of the federal and state constitutions. 105 Such attacks have
generally been made on two grounds:10 6 that the special statutes
violate equal protection'0 7 and due process. 10
8
Among those jurisdictions which have considered the
constitutionality of these statutes, there is a fairly equal split in
results reached. The highest courts of nine states' 0 9 and one federal
103. Without the special grace period established for such cases, a person injured nine years and
364 days following the completion of construction would have one day within which to file a lawsuit
against the builders.
104. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-01-44(2) (1974).
105. The issue of whether a party has standing to contest the special statute on constitutional
grounds is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of this issue, see McClanahan v. American
Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Colo. 1980).
106. The special statutes have been attacked on other grounds on a limited basis. See Plant v. R.
L. Reid, Inc., 294 Ala. 155, 313 So. 2d 518 (1975) (statute held invalid on the grounds that it was
unconstitutionally vague); Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91
N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977) (special statute challenged on grounds that the title of the statute did
not sufficiently identify the subject matter contained therein).
107. See infra notes 118-56 and accompanying text. For the purposes of this Note, the term
"equal protection" will be used as including equal protection claims under the federal and state
constitutions, as well as claims that the statute establishes a special classification or grants a special
immunity in violation of state constitutions. These claims are generally treated by the courts as
equivalent. See Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed, 401
U.S. 901 (1971).
108. See infra notes 251-84 and accompanying text. For the purposes of this Note, the term "due
process" will be used as including due process claims under the federal and state constitutions, as
well as claims that the statute denies access to the courts in violation of state constitutions. These
claims are generally treated by the courts as being equivalent. See Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage
Dist. No. 2, 366 So. 2d 1381, 1387-88 (La. 1978).
109. Plant v. R.L. Reid, Inc., 294 Ala. 155, 313 So. 2d 518 (1975); Overland Constr. Co. v.
Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Fujioka v. Kim, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); Skinner v.
Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc.,
260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143
(Okla. 1977); Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978); Kallas Millwork Corp. v.
Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821
(Wyo. 1980).
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district court" ° have struck down special statutes for constitutional
reasons. In addition, one state supreme court has found its statute
to be unconstitutional in its application to a particular fact
situation."' Conversely, the highest courts of nine states," 2 three
state intermediate appellate courts,"' and one federal district
court 1 4 have considered the constitutionality of the special statutes
and found the legislation to be proper. In addition, five state
supreme courts, 1 5 three state intermediate appellate courts," 6 and
one federal district court' 17 have applied or construed special
statutes without discussing their constitutionality, or after finding it
unnecessary to reach the issue. An analysis of these decisions may
provide important insights to courts faced with the task of
determining the constitutionality of section 28-01-44.
A. EQUAL PROTECTION
1. Cases From Other Jurisdictions
The most common basis for holding the special statutes of
limitations unconstitutional has been that such statutes violate
equal protection." 8 This conclusion was first reached in Skinner v.
Anderson,'" in which the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the
special statute of limitations applicable to suits arising out of the
defective condition of improvements to real property'20 violated the
state constitution by granting a special or exclusive privilege or
110. McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Colo. 1980).
111. Saylorv. Hall, 497 S.W.2d218(Ky. 1973).
112. Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S.
901 (1971); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1978); O'Brien v.
Hazelet & Erdal, - Mich. __ 299 N.W.2d 336 (1980); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont.
104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972);
Josephs v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co.,
476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978); Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974); Yakima Fruit &
Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972).
113. Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 59 Cal. App. 2d 675, 131
Cal. Rptr. 112 (1976), rev 'don other grounds, 21 Cal. 2d 264, 581 P.2d 197, 147 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1978);
Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977);
Hill v. Forrest & Cotton, Inc., 555 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
114. Smith v. Allen-Bradley Co., 371 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Va. 1974).
115. Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 194 Colo. 441, 578 P.2d 637 (1978); City of
Newark v. Edward H. Richardson Assoc., 375 A.2d 475 (Del. 1977); Deschamps v. Camp Dresser &
McKee, Inc., 113 N.H. 344, 306 A.2d 771 (1973); Nevada Lakeshore Co. v. Diamond Elec., Inc.,
89 Nev. 293, 511 P.2d 113 (1973); Watts v. Putnam County, 525 S.W.2d 488 (Tenn. 1975).
116. Luxurious Swimming Pools, Inc. v. Tepe,- Ind. App. -, 379 N.E.2d 992 (1978);
Allentown Plaza v. Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 43 Md. App. 337, 405 A.2d 326 (1979); Smith v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 38 N.C. 457, 248 S.E.2d 462 (1978).
117. Grissom v. North Am. Aviation, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
118. See Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 1242 (1979).
119. 38 111. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
120. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, S 24f(Smith-Hurd 1966) (re-enacted as ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83,
22.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980)).
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immunity to architects and contractors. 121 The court acknowledged
that not all legislativt classifications are constitutionally prohibited,
but stated that such classifications must be "reasonably related to
the legislative purpose." 122 In Skinner, the court first found that the
Illinois statute included within its coverage only architects and
contractors, excluding owners, possessors, materialmen, and
others. 123 Without discussing the legislative purpose for such a
classification or the underlying history of the special statutes of
limitations, the court then held that the classification was
constitutionally impermissible. 12
4
The Skinner court did little more than define the classification
scheme which existed under the Illinois statute. 125 The differences
among the various classes of potential defendants in actions arising
out of the construction of improvements to real property were not
discussed by the court. The major weakness of the decision in
Skinner, however, may lie in the court's failure to apply the standard
which it had previously found to be appropriate - that the
classification be "reasonably related to the legislative purpose. ",126
Under such Eircumstances, it is questionable whether the decision
in Skinner should be considered persuasive. The decision is
somewhat significant, however, in that it correctly defines the two
classes of potential defendants who may be denied the special
protection granted to builders - the owners or possessors of the
real property and materialmen. 
127
Despite the failure of the court in Skinner to consider the
differences among the various classes, every other reported decision
121. Skinner v. Anderson, 38111. 2d 455, 459, 231 N.E.2d 588, 590 (1967).
122. Id. at 460, 231 N.E.2d at 591.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. The court in Skinner, in support of its conclusion, stated:
[Olf all those whose negligence in connection with the construction of an improvement
to real estate might result in damage to property or injury to person more than four
years after construction is completed, the statute singles out the architect and the
contractor, and grants them immunity. It is not at all inconceivable that the owner or
person in control of such an improvement might be held liable for damage or injury
that results from a defective condition for which the architect or contractor is in fact
responsible. Not only is the owner or person in control given no immunity; the statute
takes away his action for indemnity against the architect or contractor.
The arbitrary quality of the statute clearly appears when we consider that
architects and contractors are not the only persons whose negligence in the
construction of a building or other improvement may cause damage to property or
injury to persons. If, for example, four years after a building is completetd a cornice
should fall because the adhesive used was defective, the manufacturer of the adhesive
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which has held a special statute of limitations unconstitutional on
equal protection grounds has relied, at least in part, on the opinion
of the Supreme Court of Illinois.128 These decisions recite general
rules which are applicable in equal protection cases, 129 but like the
opinion in Skinner they generally fail to discuss the legislative
policies underlying the special statutes and the possible distinctions
between the potential classes of defendants. , 30
An example of a decision which failed to discuss the legislative
policies behind the special statutes is Pacific Indemnity Co. v.
Thompson- Yaeger, Inc. 131 In Pacific Indemnity, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota reviewed prior cases from other jurisdictions which had
considered the constitutionality of the special statutes and
concluded that the better-reasoned decisions were those which
found the statutes to be unconstitutional. 132 The court stated that it
could see "no basis for including within the protection of the statute
persons who construct or design improvements to real estate, and
excluding other persons against whom third parties might bring
claims should they incur injuries, such as owners and material
suppliers. "'133
A similar approach to the problem is found in Kallas Millwork
Corp. v. Square D Co. 134 This case, like Skinner, has been relied upon
by many courts to justify a ruling that the special statute is
unconstitutional.1 35 In Kallas, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
with little further discussion, stated: "While there are public policy
reasons that might justify a limitations period that takes into
consideration those who are engaged in the construction business,
there appears no reason why only a very restricted class of those
128. See, e.g., Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 389, 225 N.W.2d 454,
458 (1975) (noting that the opinion in Skinner made it clear that the classification was constitutionally
improper).
129. Id. (discussing the standards employed in Wisconsin to test whether a legislative
classification satisfies federal and state constitutional guarantees of equal protection).
130. But see Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821,830 (Wyo. 1980). In Phillips, the court
noted the distinctions between builders and those excluded by the special statute and found those
distinctions to be unpersuasive. Id.
131. 260 N.W.2d 548(Minn. 1977).
132. Pacific Indem. Co. v Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Minn. 1977). In
Pacific Indemnity, the court stated:
We have reviewed these cases carefully and are convinced that the better reasoned
position is embodied in the decisions which hold such statutes to be unconstitutional
because they grant an immunity from suit to a certain class of defendants, without
there being a reasonable basis for that classification. We find the discussions in Skinner
v. Anderson, supra, Fujioka v. Kam, supra, and Kallas Millwork V. Square D Co., supra,
particularly thorough on this point .
Id.
133. Id.
134. 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975).
135. See260 N.W.2d at 555.
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thus occupied is protected by the statute." 136 The court dismissed
the defendant's reliance upon cases upholding the constitutionality
of such statutes, finding that such -cases "do not come to grips with
the real problem presented - what factors distinguish the favored
class so that it requires or deserves an immunity not accorded
others who appear to be similarly situated." 13 7 This comment is not
totally without merit, because some of the courts which have
upheld the constitutionality of the special statutes have employed
the same type of conclusory reasoning that is found in decisions
striking down these statutes. 138 Given the general presumption in
favor of the constitutionality of legislation,1 39 however, such
analysis may be more readily justified in cases in which the special
statutes are upheld.
It would be erroneous to conclude that all of the decisions
involving the constitutionality of the special statutes of limitations
have discussed the matter in summary fashion. The issues were
discussed at some length in Howell v. Burk. 140 In resolving the equal
protection issue, the New Mexico Court of Appeal initially
considered the purpose of the special statute. 141 That purpose was
found to be to provide a reasonable measure of protection against
the increased hazard to builders.1 42 The court in Howell also
considered the classification scheme created by the statute, and
determined that the owners or tenants of real property and
materialmen, who do no more than manufacture or supply
materials, do not benefit from the statute.14 3 Although the court
acknowledged the fact that owners and materialmen may be
exposed to claims for many years following the completion of a
construction project, the court distinguished them from builders:
The difficulties of those covered by the statute in
providing a reasonable defense to a claim made years
after the construction was completed, the absence of
136. Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 391, 225 N.W.2d 454, 459
(1975).
137. Id. at 393, 225 N.W.2d at 460.
138. See, e.g., Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974). The court in Good dismissed the
plaintiff's claim that the special statute was unconstitutional simply by stating that the claim was
without merit. Id. at 225.
139. See Benson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96,98 (N.D.
1979) ("an act of a legislature is presumed to be valid, and any doubt as to its constitutionality must,
where possible, be resolved in favor of its validity").
140. 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3,569 P.2d 413 (1977).
141. N.M. STAT. ANN. S 23-1-26 (Supp. 1.976) (currently codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. S 37-1-
27(1978)).
142. Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, -, 568 P.2d 214. 220 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M.:
3,569 P.2d 413 (1977).
143. Id. at _, 568 P.2d at 219.
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control of the premises by those covered by the statute,
and the historical differences in liability between owners
and occupiers of land and those covered by the statute
provide a reasonable basis for excluding owners and
tenants from the benefits of the statute.
There is also a reasonable basis for distinguishing
between materialmen and persons covered by the statute.
That reasonable basis lies in the work performed. "The
manufacturer makes standard goods and develops
standard processes. Defects are harder to find in the
contractor's special jobs." . . . "[T]he legislature could
reasonably have concluded that evidentiary problems
facing the architect and contractor are greater than those
facing the materialmen. "144
The court in Howell therefore concluded that there was a reasonable
basis for the legislature's distinction between those covered by the
statute and owners, tenants, and materialmen.1 4 5 Accordingly, the
court held that New Mexico's special statute of limitations did not
violate equal protection 14 6 and was not improper legislation. 147
Another in-depth analysis of the equal protection issue has
been provided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Freezer
Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co. 148 In Freezer; the court concluded
that the special statute1 4 9 was not a special law in violation of the
Pennsylvania Constitution because of the distinctions that exist
between the classes of potential defendants under the statute.
150
The court initially distinguished builders from owners, stating that
builders may be liable to a larger class of persons than owners, that
builders may be liable under various theories of liability while the
liability of landowners generally lies in tort, and that builders,
unlike owners, have no control over their liability following the
completion of construction. 151 The court then determined that the




148. 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978).
149. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. 5 5536 (Purdon Supp. 1977) (currently codified at 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5536 (Purdon Supp. 1980)).
150. Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, -, 382 A.2d 715, 720
(1978).
151. Id. at - , 382 A.2d at 718. In Freezer Storage, the court discussed the three distinctions,
stating:
First, the class of persons to whom builders may be liable is larger than the class to
which owners may be liable. Landowners may be liable to others who come onto their
land. Builders, however, may be liable both to the landowners and to others who use
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NOTE
distinction in the statute between builders and suppliers was based
upon "real differences in the business world." ' 152 The court
concluded that it was rational for the legislature to place a
limitation on the liability of builders but not suppliers because of
the difficult working conditions under which builders must
function. 153 In support of this conclusion, the court reasoned that
suppliers who produce thousands of items "can easily maintain
high quality-control standards in the controlled environment of the
factory."'154 This is not the case with builders, who face unique
problems with every construction project, and who can only pre-
test designs and construction in limited ways. 
155
Decisions such as Howell and Freezer indicate that there are
distinctions between builders and owners or materialmen. Whether
such distinctions are a sufficient basis for sustaining the
classifications made by the special statutes is another question. This
question is one which must be considered in light of the wording of
each particular statute and in light of the system of analysis which is
applicable in the jurisdiction determining the validity of a statute
challenged upon equal protection grounds. Under no
circumstances, however, should courts ignore distinctions which
may exist, as these distinctions may have been important
considerations in the legislature's decision to enact the special
statute of limitations. 156
2. North Dakota's Standards of Review
Article 1, section 22 of the North Dakota Constitution
provides that "[alll laws of a general nature shall have a uniform
the land. Second, a builder may be liable for construction defects under various legal
theories - contract, warranty, negligence and perhaps strict liability in tort.
Landowner liability for such defects, on the other hand, typically lies only in tort ...
Third, landowners can ordinarily avoid liability by taking adequate care of their land
and structures and by regulating the number and type of person entering the land and
regulating the conditions of entry. The builder has no such control over his product
after relinquishing it to the landowner. Landowner's liability is also controlled by the
myriad of common law rules limiting liability to such classes as "undiscovered
trespassers", "mere licensees", and so forth. Builder's insurance and owner's
insurance structures and pricing are also different.
Id Although North Dakota has abolished the common-law categories of licensee and invitee, see
O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1977), the discussion in Freezer is still persuasive.




156. Eyen the strictest standard of equal protection review involves some type of inquiry into
the legislative purpose, as a classification which is suspect may be sustained if the legislation was
enacted to further a compelling state interest. See Johnson v. International Harvester Co., 487 F.
Supp. 1176, 1178(D.N.D. 1980).
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operation, '"157 and section 21 prohibits the granting of special
privileges or immunities. 158 These provisions have been held to be
substantially equivalent to the guarantee of equal protection found
in the federal constitution. 5 9 Thus, the Supreme Court of North
Dakota has noted that a statute which does not offend equal
protection considerations generally applicable under the state
constitution should be constitutional under both the North Dakota
Constitution and the United States Constitution.16 0 In certain
instances, however, courts in North Dakota may apply a standard
of review which is stricter than that applicable under federal
constitutional law. 161 At one time the Supreme Court of North
Dakota applied a traditional two-tiered equal protection analysis.1
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Currently, however, the court applies a three-tiered equal
protection analysis. 163 Although this system of analysis was adopted
several years ago, the supreme court has provided little guidance
with regard to its application.
The standards of constitutional review applicable in North
Dakota were recently identified in Law v. Maercklein. 164 The North
Dakota Supreme Court in Law defined the standards as follows:
(1) the traditional rational-basis standard under which a
statute is upheld if the classification is not patently
arbitrary or if it bears some reasonable relationship to a
legitimate government interest;
(2) the strict judicial scrutiny standard used when the
classification is inherently suspect or concerns a
157. N.D. CONST. art. I, 522.
158. N.D. CONST. art. I, S 21. Section 21 provides: "No special privileges or immunities shall
ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the legislative assembly; nor shall
any citizen or class of citizens be granted privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall
not be granted to all citizens." Id.
159. See Snyder's Drug Store, Inc. v. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140,
150 (N.D. 1974); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 774-76 (N.D. 1974) (comparing state and
federal law).
160. See Caldis v. Board ofCounty Comm'rs, 279 N.W.2d 665, 672 (N.D. 1979).
161. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 775 (N.D. 1974). The court in Johnson
applied an intermediate standard of equal protection review in a challenge under the state
constitution. Id. at 780.
Although an intermediate standard has been applied by courts testing state laws against the
federal equal protection clause, its application is limited to cases in which the statute makes a quasi-
suspect classification, such as a classification based on gender. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279
(1979). When a challenged statute does not involve a suspect classification or a fundamental right,
however, it is seen only as an economic regulation and the standard of review is a minimum rational-
basis standard. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
162. See Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, 225 N.W.2d 39 (N.D. 1974). The court in
Tharaldson noted that cases involving a suspect classification or a fundamental right are subject to
strict judicial scrutiny and that other cases are tested under the "traditional" equal protection
analysis. Id. at 46-47. This "traditional" equal protection analysis requires that a legislative
classification bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Johnson v.
Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 775 (N.D. 1974).
163. See infra notes 164-94 and accompanying text.
164. 292 N.W.2d 86 (N.D. 1980).
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fundamental interest; and
(3) an intermediate standard that has been difficult to
label or define but which closely approximates the
historical, substantive due process test. This standard
requires a close correspondence between statutory
classifications and legislative goals. 
165
The court in Law did not articulate any factors to be considered in
deciding which of these three standards to apply in a particular
case. Rather, in choosing to apply the rational-basis test, the court
simply noted that the issues involved in the case 166 were "similar to
those found in cases that have applied the traditional rational-basis
test." ' 167 Thus, the language of the court in Law suggests that the
key in determining which of the three standards to apply when a
statute is challenged on equal protection grounds is a comparison of
the case in question with prior equal protection cases. This
conclusion is also supported by an earlier case, Herman v.
Mlagnuson. 168
A review of past North Dakota equal protection cases
reveals that the most severe test of constitutionality, strict scrutiny,
was applied in State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell. 169 In Maxwell, the
Supreme Court of North Dakota held that a hearing was required
before a female prisoner could be transferred to a facility outside
North Dakota for incarceration. 170 The strict scrutiny standard was
applied because the case involved a suspect classification - sex. 17
1
Under the traditional equal protection standards, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota has applied a reasonable or rational-basis
test when no suspect classification or fundamental interest is
involved. 172 This standard was applied in Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied
Judgment Fund, 173 in which the court rejected an equal protection
challenge to statutes 174 limiting the recovery from the Unsatisfied
Judgment Fund to five thousand dollars in cases in which the
165. Lawv. Maercklein, 292 N.W.2d 86,91 (N.D. 1980).
166. The case involved an attempt by a non-resident mother to recover from the Unsatisfied
Judgment Fund on ajudgment for the wrongful death of her son, a North Dakota resident. The court
found the case to be analagous to Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, 225 N.W.2d 39 (N.D.
1974), a case in which the rational-basis test was employed. 292 N.W.2d at 91.
167. 292 N.W.2d at 91.
168. 277 N.W.2d 445, 451 (N.D. 1979).
169. 259 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1977).
170. State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621,629 (N.D. 1977).
171. Id. at 632. In Maxwell, the court found sex to be a suspect classification. Cf Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion which suggests that a classification based upon
gender should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny).
172. Snyder's Drug Store, Inc. v. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140, 148
(N.D. 1974).
173. 225 N.W.2d 39 (N.D. 1974).
174. N.D. CENT. CoDE S 39-17-03.1,-07 (1980).
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tortfeasor could not be identified, while allowing a recovery of ten
thousand dollars in other cases. 1" In Tharaldson, the court
determined that the purpose of the statutes was to provide some
compensation to victims of automobile accidents who would
otherwise be left without a means of recovery. 176 The court
concluded that the means by which this purpose was to be achieved
were "matters within the competency of the legislature."1 77
Until recently, the traditional standards for determining the
constitutionality of a statute challenged on equal protection
grounds were the only standards employed by the North Dakota
Supreme Court. In Johnson v. Hassett, 178 however, the court
identified an intermediate standard, requiring a "close
correspondence between statutory classifications and legislative
goals. "179 In Johnson, the court held that the distinction between
paying and nonpaying passengers in North Dakota's guest
statute 180 .was violative of provisions of the North Dakota
Constitution forbidding the granting of special privileges and
immunities to any class of citizens. 181 Although it did not specify
the standard of review to be applied in its decision, the court in
Johnson stated: "We find that the statutory classification is
unreasonable for any purpose of legislation and is not based upon
justifiable distinctions concerning any purpose of the law, and that
it it arbitrary and overinclusive. '"182 This language was later
interpreted as being an application of what has become known as
the intermediate standard of review. 1
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The most recent North Dakota case in which the intermediate
standard of equal protection analysis was applied is Herman v.
Magnuson. 184 In Herman, the North Dakota Supreme Court
examined prior cases in which equal protection had been an issue to
determine which of the three equal protection standards it should
apply. 185 After doing so, the court rejected the traditional
standards in favor of the intermediate standard of equal protection
analysis. 186
175. Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, 225 N.W.2d 39, 47 (N.D. 1974).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974).
179. Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 775 (N.D. 1974). For further discussion of the
development of the intermediate standard of equal protection analysis, see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971); Tribe, TheSupreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1, 121-22 (1973).
180. N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-15-01 (repealed 1979).
181. 217 N.W.2d at 780.
182. Id.
183. Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 451 (N.D. 1979). See also supra notes 160-63 and
accompanying text.
184. 277 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1979).
185. Id. at 451.
186. Id.
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The issue in Herman was the validity of a ninety-day notice
requirement in actions against municipalities. 187 This issue was
found to be more closely related to the issue in Johnson than to the
issues in cases which had applied either of the two traditional
standards. 188 In support of this conclusion, the court stated that,
like Johnson, Herman involved a "limitation upon the authority of
an injured party to bring an action against the tortfeasor.' ' 189 The
ninety-day notice requirement was upheld by the court under the
intermediate standard against claims that it violated equal
protection. 190  The court concluded that there was a close
correspondence between the statutory classification and the
legislative goal of protecting municipal corporations from the
consequences of damage suits arising out of claims which they
would not otherwise have an opportunity to properly investigate. 191
The strict scrutiny test was easily rejected in Herman because
the case did not involve a suspect classification or fundamental
interest. 192 The court also rejected the rational-basis test and
distinguished Tharaldson by stating that, because the plaintiff in
Tharaldson had no recourse except for the action of the legislature, it
was constitutionally permissible for the legislature to impose
reasonable limits on the right to bring that action. 193
3. Equal Protection and Section 28-01 -44
Courts called upon to determine the validity of section
28-01-44 in light of claims that the statute violates equal protection
should initially determine which of the three North Dakota








194. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
195. In State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1980), section 6-08-16.2 of the North
Dakota Century Code was challenged on state and federal equal protection grounds. Section 6-08-
16.2 allowed the drawer of a non-sufficient fund check to be prosecuted for the commission of a
felony if he had been previously convicted under section 6-08-16 of the Code. N.D. CENT. CoDE 5 6-
08-16.2 (Supp. 1979). In Carpentmr, the Supreme Court of North Dakota applied an intermediate
standard of review requiring that the classification made by the statute be substantially related to an
important state interest. 301 N.W.2d at 109-10. The court then held section 6-08-16.2
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Id. at 110. The court, however, did not specify
whether the case was decided upon state or federal grounds. If the court's decision was based upon
state constitutional law it would result in a stricter level of scrutiny at the intermediate level.
Although it is not clear that the court decided the case solely on federal equal protection grounds, this
seems to be the most probable conclusion. It is unlikely that the supreme court would modify the
important intermediate standard without specifically acknowledging that fact. Furthermore, in its
discussion of the various equal protection standards, the court focused exclusively on United States
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of the law in North Dakota, it appears that this decision should be
based upon a comparison with prior equal protection cases. 196 Such
a comparison indicates that the intermediate standard of review
should be applied in a case in which section 28-01-44 is challenged
on equal protection grounds. The statute does not involve a suspect
classification or a fundamental interest, 197 nor does the statute
create a new remedy which would not exist in the absence of the
statute. 198 Rather, the special statute of limitations, like the statutes
at issue in Herman and Johnson, is a "limitation upon the authority
of an injured party to bring an action against the tortfeasor." 199
Thus, in light of the criteria suggested by the North Dakota
Supreme Court, it appears that an intermediate standard of review
should be applied if section 28-01-44 is challenged as being violative
of equal protection.
Once a court has decided which standard of review to apply
in determining the constitutionality of section 28-01-44, it should
make a two-fold inquiry: 1) whether the required relationship
between the classification established by the statute and the
legislative purpose exists, and 2) whether the statute applies
uniformly to those similarly situated within a class.200 The first
inquiry requires an application of the equal protection
considerations previously discussed. 201 The latter inquiry should
involve an analysis of the distinctions which exist between the
various classes affected by the statute to determine whether the
classification made by the statute is justifiable. 202
North Dakota's intermediate standard of review requires a
"close correspondence between statutory classifications and
legislative goals. '203 This requirement suggests that a court should
first determine the legislative purpose, and then evaluate the
classification scheme in light of that purpose.
The goal of the legislature in enacting the special statute of
limitations for builders was not specifically stated in section 28-01-
44.204 Furthermore, the preamble to the original bill merely
indicates that the statute was enacted "[tlo provide a period of
Supreme Court cases. Id. at 109-10. Thus, the court's decision in Carpenter apparently has had no
effect on North Dakota's system of equal protection analysis under its state constitutional provisions.
196. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
197. See State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621, 632 (N.D. 1977).
198. See Tharaldson v. UnsatisfiedJudgment Fund, 225 N.W.2d 39, 47 (N.D. 1974).
199. 277 N.W.2d at 451.
200. SeeCaldis v. Board of County Comm'rs, 279 N.W.2d 665, 670 (N.D. 1979).
201. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
202. See infta notes 227-48 and accompanying text.
203. Law v. Maercklein, 292 N.W.2d 86, 91 (N.D. 1980).
204. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01-44 (1974).
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limitation within which time claims for damages may be brought
against persons performing or furnishing the design, planning,
supervision or observation of construction or improvements on real
property. "205 This statement does not identify the underlying
reasons for the special legislation. Courts20 6 and commentators
20 7
which have analyzed similar statutes, however, generally agree that
these statutes were enacted in an attempt to provide relief for those
faced with increased exposure to liability as a result of the
construction of improvements to real property. 20 8  The limited
legislative history available with regard to section 28-01-44 appears
to support this conclusion.
209
Assuming that the legislature intended section 28-01-44 to
provide relief to those faced with a significant recent increase in
exposure to liability as a result of the construction of improvements
to real property, the general classifications made by the statute
appear to be reasonable. Builders historically were not liable to
205. 1967 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 254.
206. Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, -, 293 A.2d 662, 665 (1972).
207. See Neeson, The Current Status of Professional Architects' and Engineers' Malpractice Liability
Insurance, 45 INS. COUNSEL.J. 39, 44 (1978); Vandall, Architects'Liability in Georgia: A Special Statute of
Limitations, 14GA. S.BJ. 164, 166(1978).
208. The goal which other courts and commentators suggest should be attributed to the
legislatures in their enactment of special statutes of limitations is similar to that explicitly stated in
the recently enacted North Dakota Products Liability Act. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 28-01.1 (Supp.
1979). This act provides a ten-year period of limitation for actions against manufacturers similar to
that provided in section 28-01-44 for builders. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02 (Supp. 1979). The
opening provisions of the act serve as a declaration of legislative findings and intent:
1. The legislative assembly finds that the number of lawsuits and claims for damages
and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from defective products has
substantially increased in recent years. Because of these increases, the insurance
industry has drastically increased the cost of products liability insurance. The effect of
increased insurance premiums and increased claims has increased product cost
through manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers passing the cost of premiums to the
consumer. Certain product manufacturers are discouraged from continuing to provide
and manufacture certain products because of the high cost and possible unavailability
of products liability insurance.
2. Because of these recent trends, and for the purpose of alleviating the adverse effects
which these trends are producing in the manufacturing industry, it is necessary to
protect the public interest by enacting measures designed to encourage private
insurance companies to continue to provide products liability insurance.
3. It is the purpose of sections 28-01. 1-01 through 28-01.1-05 to provide a reasonable
time within which actions may be commenced against manufacturers, while limiting
the time to a specific period for which products liability insurance premiums can be
reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural changes to
expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims.
N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01.1-01 (Supp. 1979).
The opening provisions of the Products Liability Act indicate that the legislation is designed to
alleviate the adverse effects on the manufacturing industry that have been produced recently because
of the substantial increase in litigation, and to protect the public interest by ensuring that private
insurance companies continue to provide products liability insurance. Id. A similar rationale might
be attributed to the legislature's enactment of section 28-01-44, because the problems faced by the
construction industry are similar to those which prompted the legislature's enactment of the Products
Liability Act to protect manufacturers. See Neeson, The Current Status of Professional Architects' and
Engineers'Malpractice Liability Insurance, 45 INS. COUNSEL.J. 39, 44 (1978).
209. See supra note 9.
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third parties once a structure was accepted,2 10 but owners and
possessors of land have always remained potentially liable to third
parties who enter on land, owing them some specific duty of
care under the common-law rules. 211 This liability to third parties
has generally been regarded as part of the responsibility of
possessing or controlling the land. 2 12 Like owners and possessors of
land, materialmen were not faced with an increase in liability
before the enactment of section 28-01-44. The doctrine of privity as
applied to manufacturers was first rejected over fifty years before
section 28-01-44 was enacted. 213 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude
that the legislature was concerned only with builders. Whether the
distinctions between the various groups are sufficient to justify this
concern and the classification resulting from it is a separate
inquiry.
214
There is one classification made by section 28-01-44 which
does not bear a close correspondence to the legislative goal. This
improper classification results from the difference in the time
allowed for the bringing of actions by those injured in the ninth
year and those injured in the tenth year following construction.
215
For instance, one injured nine years and one day after construction
is complete has one year and 364 days within which-to file an action
against the builders. 216 A person injured eight years and 364 days
following the completion of construction, however, has only one
year and one day within which to bring an action. 217 This
distinction, arising out of the grace period provided by the
legislature for those injured in the tenth year following the
completion of construction, 218  does not relate to the primary
legislative goal of providing relief to builders faced with increased
210. After completion and acceptance of a building, the builder was relieved of liability for
accidents caused by defective construction, and the liability attached to the owner. Ford v. Sturgis,
14 F.2d 253, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1927). This rule was later rejected in Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469,
474 (D.C. Cir. 1956), in which the court overruled Ford and adopted the rule of MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See infra note 213. See also Comment, 60 Ky.
L.J. 462, 463 (1972) (discussion of the policy articulated in Ford).
211. See Comment, 60 Ky. L.J. 462, 463 (1972).
212. Id. The owner was thus liable for damages attributed to his own negligence (for example,
for not properly maintaining an improvement to his property) as well as for the negligence of the
builders. Id.
213. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (holding that lack
of privity was no defense in an action for injuries allegedly arising out of the manufacturer's
negligence). The requirement of privity between parties, however, was not abolished in cases
involving builders until much later. See Inman v. Binghamton Housing Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143
N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957). See also Neeson, The Current Status of Professional Architects'and
Engineers 'Malpractice Liability Insurance, 45 INS. COuNSELJ. 39, 43-44 (1978).
214. See infra notes 224-48 and accompanying text.
215. One injured in the ninth year has the remainder of the ten-year period, while one injured
in the tenth year has two years from the date of the injury. N.D. CENT. ConE § 28-01-44 (1974).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. N.D. CENT. ConE § 28-01-44(2)(1974).
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exposure to liability. Although it is true that the grace period was
created because the legislature wished to avoid the harsh
consequences that might otherwise result,21 9  the arbitrary
distinction between those injured in the ninth and tenth years after
construction probably does not satisfy North Dakota's intermediate
standard of review. In fact, it is doubtful whether the classification
arising out of the grace period would be sustained if the traditional
rational-basis test were applied, as there appears to be no reason for
distinguishing between the affected groups in such a manner.
220
Although the grace period found in section 28-01-44(2) may
result in an improper classification, the entire statute need not be
invalidated. North Dakota courts have consistently held that even
though one part of a law is declared unconstitutional the remainder
generally should not be declared void. 221 An entire statute should
be declared unconstitutional only if all of the provisions in that
statute are so connected and dependent upon each other that it
cannot be presumed that the legislature would have enacted the
valid sections without those found to be unconstitutional. 222
Because the grace period is ancillary to the primary purpose of the
statuteand because the statute is worded in such a way that this
provision can be severed without doing violence to the whole, the
fact that an improper classification arises out of the grace period
arguably should not affect the validity of the remainder of the
statute 223
Because the general classifications made by section 28-01-44
apparently satisfy the requirement that they closely correspond to
the legislative purpose, and the improper classification arising
out of the grace period is severable, it is necessary to consider
whether the special statute applies uniformly to those similarly
situated. 224 The resolution of this issue turns upon the distinctions
between those entitled to invoke the protection of the statute and
219. See supra note 103.
220. See Comment, Limitation ofAction Statutes for Architects and Builders - Blueprint for Non-Action,
18 CATH. U.L, REv. 361 (1969).
221. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 137 (N.D. 1978).
222. Id.
223. The rules applicable to constitutional challenges in North Dakota make it unlikely that the
issue of the improper classification made by section 28-01-44(2) will ever be raised. Generally, if a
statute may be constitutionally applied to a person, that person lacks standing to challenge the
statute on the grounds that it might conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others. State v.
Unterseher, 255 N.W.2d 882, 886 (N.D. 1977). Thus, because only those injured in the ninth year
following the completion of construction are adversely affected by the classification resulting from the
grace period, only this limited group of individuals should be allowed to raise the issue in court. Id.
In addition, because of policies which mandate that a court inquire into the constitutionality of a
statute only to the extent required by a particular case, Tooz v. State, 76 N.D. 599, 38 N.W.2d 285
(1949), it would be improper for a court to raise the issue of the improper classification in section 28-
01-44(2) asjustification for invalidating the entire statute.
224. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
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those excluded. Owners are excluded by the specific language of
section 28-01-44,221 and therefore a discussion of the factors that
distinguish owners from builders is appropriate. The distinctions
between materialmen and builders will also be discussed, although
the court's construction of section 28-01-44 will dictate whether or
not this issue will arise.
226
The differences between owners and builders justify the
exclusion of owners and possessors of land from the coverage of
section 28-01-44. Even courts which have struck down special
statutesof limitations as violative of equal protection have suggested
that it was proper to exclude owners and tenants.2 27 The distinction
generally cited to support this exclusion is that owners and other
possessors of land have control over the real property. 228 This is a
significant difference, because it allows such persons to regulate
their liability by controlling those who enter the property and
defining the conditions of entry. 229 Owners and possessors of
property can also avoid liability through proper maintenance of the
land. 23 0 Builders, however, have no such control over the property
once construction is complete. Furthermore, owners and possessors
of land can terminate their liability by disposing of the property.
No such relief is available to builders, who in the absence of
legislation similar to section 28-01-44 would be faced with
perpetual liability. 2
31
The more difficult question in determining the validity of
section 28-01-44 involves the distinctions between builders and
materialmen. This is because materialmen, like builders, do not
have control over the property after the improvement has been
completed. Therefore, materialmen are clearly distinguishable
from owners and possessors.
23 2
225. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01-44(3) (1974).
226. Some courts have suggested that materialmen should be included among those allowed to
invoke the special statutes of limitations because of the language used in these statutes. See Wiggins v.
Procter & Schwartz, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 350, 353 (E.D. Va. 1971). It such a construction of section
28-01-44 were adopted, the issue of the distinctions between materialmen and builders would not
anse.
227. Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); Muzar v. Metro Town Houses, Inc.,
82 Mich. App. 368, 266 N.W.2d 850 (1978). But see Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness,
563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977).
228. See, e.g., Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa, 270, -, 382 A.2d
715, 718 (1978) (the builder has no control over the property and consequently has no way to avoid
liability once the property is relinquished to the landowner).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. A third party injured at any time in the future could allege negligence on the part of the
builder. Because the cause of action would not accrue until the time of the injury, a builder is
potentially liable as long as the improvement exists. A builder may also be perpetually liable to an
owner if the discovery rule adopted for medical malpractice in Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507
(N.D. 1968), is extended to actions involving builders. See also Note, Malpractice: The Design
Professional's Dilemrnma, 10J. MAR.J. PRAC. &Proc. 287, 308 (1976).
232. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
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The distinction between builders and materialmen in section
28-01-44 is one between those who provide services and those who
provide goods. Such a distinction exists in other areas of the law.
Perhaps the most obvious example is the Uniform Commercial
Code. 233 In North Dakota, the provisions of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code apply to goods, but not to services. 234 Another area
of the law in which a distinction is made between those who provide
goods and those who provide services is strict liability in tort, with
many jurisdictions refusing to apply the doctrine to those who
provide only services. 235 In light of the existing areas of law which
have distinguished between those who provide goods and those who
provide services in defining the scope of liability, it does not seem
unreasonable for the legislature to have employed such a distinction
in section 28-01-44.
Perhaps a more obvious distinction between builders and
materialmen, and another reason for upholding the constitutionality
of section 28-01-44, is the difference in the working conditions of
the two groups. 236  Manufacturers work in a controlled
environment where they can more easily maintain quality control.
The working conditions generally allow manufacturers to test a
product before beginning production, to discover flaws, and to
make the necessary modifications. In addition, manufacturers can
test individual items while production is ongoing to ensure that
standards are being maintained. 
237
The position of the builder is completely different from that of
the manufacturer. Even in projects in which a standardized design
is implemented or the materials are pre-cut, builders must still
concern themselves with the particular location of the building and
soil and climate conditions. 238 Because they do not work in a
controlled environment, builders may be required to adapt the
construction process to delays caused by such things as poor
weather or the failure of one of the many different groups involved
in the construction process to meet its obligations. 239 The process of
construction is a process of integration.2 40 Because of the many
constituent parts involved and the case-by-case judgments which
233. N.D. CENT. CODE chs. 41-01 to 41-09 (1968 & Supp. 1979).
234. Air Heaters, Inc. v.Johnson Elec., Inc., 258 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1977).
235. See, e.g., St. Luke's Hosp. v. Schmaltz, 188 Colo. 353, 534 P.2d 781 (1975) (holding that
strict liability did not apply to the providing of medical services because the sale of a product is a
necessary element of such a cause of action).





240. See supra note 70.
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must be made as to how the system can best be integrated, the
builder's responsibilities differ significantly. from those of a
materialman.
The burden of defending potential lawsuits, as a practical
matter, may weigh more heavily on builders than on
manufacturers. An action against a manufacturer will generally be
founded upon strict liability in tort.2 41 In such cases, the plaintiff
has the burden of proving that there was a defect in the product at
the time it left the manufacturer's hands. 24 2 If this burden of proof
is met, the manufacturer's only defense entails proving that the
later action of another party somehow has relieved the
manufacturer of liability.2 4 3 The gravamen of the complaint against
a builder, however, is generally negligence. 24 4 Thus, the builder
may avoid liability if he can show that he exercised reasonable care
under the circumstances.245 In order for the builder to establish that
he exercised reasonable care, it may be necessary for him to save
the thousands of documents produced in connection with each
construction project, so that the appropriate records will be
available.24 6 This would definitely become a problem if section 28-
01-44 were found to be invalid, because it would result in
potentially perpetual liability for those involved in construction.
24 7
A similar burden does not exist under the theory of strict liability,
because the manufacturer's reasonable care in the production of a
product is not a defense .
24 8
It is true that the operation of the limitation period contained
in section 28-01-44 may produce harsh and seemingly inequitable
consequences to individuals in particular cases. Courts should
recognize, however, that the absence of such a statute might have
an equally unjust and burdensome effect on builders as a class. By
enacting section 28-01-44, the legislature has determined that the
burden of deficiencies in construction will remain with the builder
for ten years, and thereafter will fall upon individuals. Although
there may be disagreement as to the wisdom of the legislature's
judgment in this matter, acts of the legislature in North Dakota are
241. See, e.g., Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978).
242. Herman v. General Irrigation Co., 247 N.W.2d 472, 479 (N.D. 1976).
243. The plaintiff in a strict liability action is relieved of the burden of showing negligence on
the part of the manufacturer, and whether the manufacturer actually was negligent is immaterial. Id.
at 476. To escape liability or reduce damages, the manufacturer must show that the product was
materially altered or misused, or that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury. See Olson v. A. W.
Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977).
244. See, e.g., Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978).
245. Van Ornum v. Otter Tail Power Co., 210 N.W.2d 188, 201 (N.D. 1973).
246. See Vandall, Architects' Liability in Georgia: A Special Statute of Limitations, 14 GA. S.B.J. 164,
166 (1978).
247. See supra ndte 231.
248. See supra note 243.
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presumed to be constitutional.2 49 To rebut this presumption, one
must show that a statute clearly violates some provision of the state
or federal constitution. 250 In light of this presumption of validity
and the important distinctions that have been recognized between
builders and those excluded by section 28-01-44, the statute should
not be invalidated on the grounds that it violates equal protection.
B. DUE PROCESS
The second major challenge made against the special statutes
of limitations for builders is that such statutes deny a plaintiff due
process. 25 1 Due process challenges may be based upon federal
or state constitutional provisions. 252 Such challenges are generally
based upon the proposition that the legislature should not be able to
deprive an injured person of a remedy. 253 Although the due process
issue has not been determinative in most cases ,254 it is an issue
which will be raised if the constitutionality of section 28-01-44 is
challenged.
1. Cases From Other Jurisdictions
The majority of jurisdictions which have considered the due
process issue have concluded that the special statutes of limitations
do not violate this constitutional guarantee. 255 Many of the courts
which have found such statutes to be unconstitutional have
not reached the due process issue. 256 Some courts which have
found the special statutes unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds, however, have concluded that the statutes do not deny
due process.
257
249. State v. Hanson, 256 N.W.2d 364, 366 (N.D. 1977).
250. Id.
251. Compare Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3,
569 P.2d 413 (1977) withJosephs v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971). Both courts employed
similar reasoning and language, and both relied upon Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929), in
which the Court stated that "the Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the
abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible legislative object." The
court in Howell, however, based its decision on due process, while the court inJosephs relied on a state
constitutional provision guaranteeing access to the courts.
252. See, e.g., Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143, 145 (Okla. 1977).
253. Id.
254. Only two cases have relied primarily on due process as grounds for finding a special statute
unconstitutional. Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Saylor v. Hall, 497
S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1973).
255. See infra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967) (holding the special
statute unconstitutional based upon state equal protection grounds, and therefore finding it
unnecessary to discuss due process).
257. Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v.
Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977).
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Only two cases have relied primarily on due process grounds
for striking down special statutes of limitations for builders. 258 In
Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons, 2 59 the Supreme Court of Florida
held that the special statute 260 was unconstitutional as a violation of
the state constitutional provision 26 I requiring that courts be open
to every person for redress. 262 The court found that the right of an
injured person to bring an action against builders for injuries
suffered as a result of alleged negligence in construction was a right
to redress which was guaranteed. 263 The court acknowledged that
cases in other jurisdictions have reached contrary results, but
distinguished such cases as having been decided "under a much
less exacting standard" than is applicable in Florida. 
264
In Saylor v. Hall, 2 65 the Supreme Court of Kentucky employed
reasoning similar to that relied upon in Overland. The court ruled
that the Kentucky special statute of limitations 266  was
unconstitutional in its application to the facts presented in that
case. 2 67 The court declined, however, to formulate any broader rule
of constitutionality. The case involved an improvement that had
been constructed before the statute was passed, but which did not
produce an injury until after the statute had been enacted. The
court recited the general rule that the legislature has no power to
cut off an existing remedy entirely or to shorten the applicable
limitation period once it has begun to run. 268 Thus, the court
concluded: "Surely then, the application of purported limitation
statutes in such manner as to destroy a cause of action before it
legally exists cannot be permissible if it accomplishes destruction of
a constitutionally protected right of action. "269
The arguments relied upon in Overland and Saylor were
countered in Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 2 70 in which
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld a special statute
271
against a claim that it violated the state constitutional provision
272
258. See infra notes 259-69 and accompanying text.
259. 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979).
260. FLA. STAT. ANN. S 95.11(3)(c) (West Supp. 1974) (currently codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. 5
95.11 (3) (c) (West Supp. 1981)).
261. FLA. CONST. art. 1, 521.
262. Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1979).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 575.
265. 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973).
266. Ky. REv. STAT. § 413.135 (1972).
267. Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 225 (Ky. 1973).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978).
271. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 5 5536 (Purdon Supp. 1977) (currently codified at 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5536 (Purdon Supp. 1980)).
272. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
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which guaranteed open courts. 27 3 The court noted that it is within
the legislature's power to abrogate common-law rights.
27 4
Furthermore, the court noted that a decision to the contrary would
produce a "stagnation of the law in the face of changing societal
conditions," 275 and would offend the system of checks and balances
appropriate between the various branches of government. 
276
Other courts which have upheld the special statutes against
claims that they violate due process by barring a cause of action
before it has arisen have noted that the statutes are not improper
because they do not interfere with a vested right. 27 7 The reasoning
of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Rosenberg v. Town of North
Bergen278 is persuasive in this regard:
This formulation suggests a misconception of the effect of
the statute. It does not bar a cause of action; its effect,
rather, is to prevent what might otherwise be a cause of
action, from ever arising. Thus injury occurring more
than ten years after the negligent act allegedly responsible
for the harm, forms no basis for recovery. The injured
party literally has no cause of action. The harm that has
been done is damnum absque injuria - a wrong for which
the law affords no redress. The function of the statute is
thus rather to define substantive rights than to alter or
modify a remedy. The Legislature is entirely at liberty to
create new rights or abolish old ones as long as no vested
right is disturbed. 27 9
Even courts which have held the special statutes of limitations
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds have acknowledged
273. Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, -, 382 A.2d 715, 720
(1978).
274. Id.
275. Id. at __ , 382 A.2d at 720 (quoting Singer v. Shepard, 464 Pa. 387, 399, 346 A.2d
897, 903 (1975)).
276. 476 Pa. at____, 382 A.2d at 721. The court in Freezer Storage stated:
This Court would encroach upon the Legislature's ability to guide the
development of the law if we invalidated legislation simply because the rule enacted by
the Legislature rejects some cause of action currently preferred by the court. To do so
would be to place certain rules of the "common law" and certain non-constitutional
decisions of courts above all change except by constitutional amendment. Such a result
would offend our notion of the checks and balances between the various branches of
government, and of the flexibility required for the healthy growth of the law.
Id.
277. Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976); Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M.
688, 568 P.2d 214 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3,569 P.2d 413 (1977).
278. 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972).
279. Rosenbergv. Town of North Bergen, 61 NJ. 190, -, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972).
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that the statutes do not violate due process considerations by
abrogating a common-law right. 280 Thus, regardless of the position
courts take on the constitutionality of the special statutes, the
majority of courts agree that such statutes do not violate due
process.
Claims that the special statutes deny access to the courts or
violate state constitutional provisions guaranteeing a remedy for
any injury have generally been analyzed in terms similar to those
employed in general discussions of the due process issue. 281 Courts
have found that state constitutional provisions are satisfied by the
statutes, noting that legislatures have not disturbed vested rights by
their enactment of the special statutes. 282 Furthermore, it has been
pointed out that third parties who are injured after the passage of
the special limitation period are not completely without a
remedy. 28 3  Because the special statutes do not affect the
responsibility of owners, tenants, and persons in actual possession
of the property, a third party who is injured on the property may
have a cause of action against this group of people.
28 4
2. Section 28-01-44 and Due Process Considerations
Article 1, section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution provides
in part that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every man for any
injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have
remedy by due process of law. ", 2 5 In addition, section 12 of article
1 mandates that no person be "deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law."286 These provisions form the basis for
any due process challenge to section 28-01-44 under the state
constitution.
Like the special statutes interpreted in other jurisdictions,
North Dakota's special statute of limitations is one of abrogation
with respect to claims which accrue against builders after the
applicable limitation period has elapsed, since it precludes any
action from being filed against a builder ten years after construction
is complete. 287 It therefore operates to define substantive rights,
280. Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7,514 P.2d 568 (1973); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v.
Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977).
281. See supra note 254.
282. See, e.g., Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978)
(holding that the special statute of limitations did not constitute special legislation and did not violate
state constitutional provisions requiring courts to be open for any person injured).
283. Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, __ , 551 P.2d 647, 652 (1976).
284. Id.
285. N.D. CONST. art. 1, S 9.
286. N.D. CoNsT. art. 1, S 12.
287. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-44(1) (1974).
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and prevents a cause of action for injuries incurred more than ten
years following the completion of construction from ever
accruing.
2 88
The provisions of the North Dakota Constitution applicable in
a due process challenge to section 28-01-44 are similar to those
interpreted in other jurisdictions. 28 9 As noted, the overwhelming
weight of authority indicates that the special statutes do not violate
state constitutional guarantees of due process. Therefore, the
reasoning of these courts should be persuasive in resolving a due
process challenge to section 28-01-44, and courts should find that
the statute does not unconstitutionally deny access to the courts.
North Dakota courts have applied standards of review to due
process claims similar to those applied in cases where a statute is
challenged on equal protection grounds.2 90 The application of such
considerations, however, does not preclude the elinination or
limitation of a right, but simply requires that any such action not be
arbitrarily taken.29' Thus, the same reasoning which justifies the
statutory classifications created by section 28-01-44 against equal
protection claims 292 should suffice to uphold the statute when it is
challenged on due process grounds.
IV. CONCLUSION
Section 28-01-44 is representative of the legislative trend of
enacting special statutes of limitations for particular groups such as
builders.293 Although the wisdom of this trend is questionable, 294
288. See supra notes 74-99 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 214 (1977) (statute challenged
was upheld under state constitutional provisions providing that courts be open to every person who is
injured and under due process).
290. SeeArneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771
(N.D. 1974).
291. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 129 (N.D. 1978).
292. See supra notes 195-208 and accompanying text.
293. Under current North Dakota law, a products liability action against a manufacturer must
be brought within ten years. N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01.1-02 (Supp. 1979). In addition, actions for
alleged medical malpractice must be brought within six years of the date of the alleged negligent act.
See N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01-18(3)(Supp. 1979).
294. Watts v. Putnam County, 525 S.W.2d 488, 494-95 (Tenn. 1975). In Watts, the court
noted:
We do not necessarily agree philosophically with the results we reach. We can
only construe the statute as it is, not as we think it ought to be.
We note with concern the recent tendency of special interest groups to promote
the passage of particularized statutes of limitations in the area of tort law. We do not
impugn the motives of any such group, but we are concerned with the fundamental
fairness involved in the imposition of differing periods of limitation on different
individuals and groups. For example, Tennessee now has a three-year statute of
limitations on medical malpractice, a four-year statute governing malpractice actions
against architects, and a one-year statute governing actions against lawyers; all
complicated by the fact that the discovery rule no longer applies to medical
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the function of a court called on to determine the validity of the
statute is to "determine whether the legislature has acted
reasonably in respect to their mandate from the people as set out in
the Constitution. "295 Thus, the fact that a court may consider the
special statute unwise or potentially unfair should not be
determinative of the issue.
Courts should consider the classifications made by section 28-
01-44 in light of the distinctions which exist among the various
groups affected by the statute. Possible legislative goals should also
be considered in determining the validity of the special statute.
Such considerations suggest that the classifications made by section
28-01-44 are not unreasonable.
Admittedly, the limitation period established by section 28-01-
44 may result in a hardship in some cases, but the statute also
operates to prevent hardship to builders. In this regard, section 28-
01-44 is not unique. Many other statutes serve to work for some
and against others. 
296
It is for the legislature to weigh the conflicting concerns that
exist. Section 28-01-44 represents the legislature's judgment as to
how the existing concerns in this area of the law can best be
balanced. In the absence of constitutional infirmities in section 28-
01-44, courts should therefore consider the balance struck by the
legislature on this issue to be decisive.
PAMELAJ. HERMES
malpractice actions but does apply against architects and attorneys. All of this points
to the urgency of the need for a comprehensive revision of all statutes of limitations in
Tennessee to the end that uniform periods of limitation be established and applied.
Id.
295. Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, - , 455 S.W.2d 918, 921 (1970), appeal
dismissed, 401 U.S. 901 (1971).
296. Id.
